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~lwy ~.ld.t 1 •. SUNMARY: Resp 's car was towed to the police pound because 
N 1(,."'-s'r'l l. t had two k. · k A h d h 1· b k · par 1.ng t1.c ets. t t e poun , t e po 1.ce ro e 1.nto 
:::~~ the loc~ed c-~-an; pe~formed a routine inventory search. They 
f~-li.t 
rufi,.. 
found a small amount of marijuana in the closed but unlocked 
~. glove compartment. 
. ~ nut 
Petr was convicted of possession • The South 
Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search of the 
g~ove c~ unreasonable in light of all the circumstances. 




2~ FACTS: Resp's car r eceived two tickets in the morning 
of the same day (3 a.m. and 10 a.m.). The police then had it 
towed to the police pound. The police had no reason to believe 
that the car contained any incriminating evidence or contraband, 
nor did they need to search the car to discover the owner. 
A police officer at the pound observed several objects, including 
a watch, on the dashboard. He broke into the locked car and 
inventoried the objects on the dashboard. He then opened the 
unlocked glove compartment and discovered a small amount of 
marijuanae When resp came to pick up his car at 5:00 that 
afternoon, he was arrested. Resp was convicted of possession. 
The South Dakota Sup. Ct . reversed. It held that the inventory 
was a search and had to be evaluated for reasonableness in iight 
of all the circumstances. It distinguished Cady v. Dombrowski, 
413- U.S. 433 (1973); Ha r ris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); 
and Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), as not covering 
this case . It t hen held that it was reasonable in 
t h is ca se for the poli ce to enter the car for the purpose of 
removing the objects in plain view from the outside [the court 
held t hat such r emoval plus locking the car would -insulate the 
police from all l iability for theft], but that it was not 
reasonable t o conduct an exploratory search into closed compartments. 
The dissent objected to restricting the police to an inventory 
of only t hose i tems t hat are in plain view within the interior 
of an automobile . 
3. CONTENTIONS : Petr contends that the decision is in 
conflict with this Court's decisions in Cady, Ha~ris, and Cooper. 
It also alleges tha t there is a conflict between the 
circuits (cases cited petn a t 9) and between the state 
supreme courts (cases cited petn at 7-8). The response 
- tracks the Sup. Ct. decision. 
4. DISCUSSION : Although Fourth Amendment questions tend 
to be fact-specific, the state courts and at least two circuits 
*I (CA 5 and CA 8- ) seem sp li t on the question whether a routine 
inventory search based solely on the fact of police custody -- ~'----------------------------------------~~ is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. This case would be 
- --- "'--------7',.. 
an ideal vehicle for deciding t hat i ssue but for the South 
Dakota Sup. Ct.'s ruling that r emoval of all objects in plain 
view plus locking the car protects the police from liability 
for theft. This ruling elimi nated t he police department's basic 
justification for looking i n the glove compartment. The case 
does present the question whether any justification at all is 
necessary for an inventory search, but it might be advisable to 
grant cert. only in a case that presents both the threshold 
question and the issue of the effect of what seems to be the 
most common justification for inventories--protection against 
liability for theft. 
There is a response. Op. in petn. 
10113175 Block 
_!:_I CA 5 has approved pure-custody inventories, see United States 
v. Penning :on, 441 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1971), cer~denied, 404 
U.S. 854 ( -~Y'/1), while CA 8 has disapproved, see United States 
v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973). 
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TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Greg Palm DATE: March 29, 1976 
No. 75-76 South Dakota v. Opperman 
The decision below should be affirmed. I have 
concluded that: (1) warrentless pol ice "inventories" of 
cars temporarily in their possession are "searches" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and (2) weighing the 
competing interests involved, such searches are unreasonable. 
In recent years, courts increasingly have considered 
the issue of the constitutionality of routine inventory searches 
of vehicles in temporary police custody. In an inventory 
the contents of the car are thoroughly catalogued, and criminal 
evidence seized , if discovered, without a warrant. Accepting 
that the possessory interest acquired by the police under a 
forfeiture statute a~Jows a warrantless search, Cooper v. 
California, 386 u.s. j (l967),* even the most expansionary reading 
* Cooper was convicted of the sale of heroin, wrapped in 
brown paper, which he had sold to a police informer. Shortly after th 
transaction, Cooper's car was staked out, and he was arrested while 
unlocking the car. The car was immediately searched, then impounded, 
pursuant to state statute, pending a forfeiture proceeding. One week 
later, the police searched it again, discovering in the glove 
compartment a piece of brown paper which was later introduced at trial 
Title to the car had not passed by the time of the second search. 
The Court in Qooper presented two factors which it seemed 
to indicate would justify the warrantless search of an impounded 
vehicle. Firstz the car was held in connection with crim1nal 
activity for wh1ch an arrest had been made; the Court seemed to be 
2. 
'* of Cooper cannot extend its rationale to cases in which the 
police do not have the right to deny possession to the car's ...__ 
owner. Nor can the traditional exigent circumstances exemption 
from the warrant requirement justify most inventory searches, 
since the vehicles involved in such cases are generally taken 
when there is no danger that the car will be removed. A 
car may be towed for violation of a parking regulation (as 
in this case), and impounded until it is claimed; a car might 
be towed from the scene of an accident, when the driver is 
incapacitated; or a car might be impounded for safekeeping, 
because the driver has been arrested. 
(footnote continued) 
pointing out the presence of probable cause for the search. 
Second, the car was to be seized under state law for a considerable 
period of time; since the police could deny possession of the 
car to its owner, they had possessory rights of their own. Because 
the relationship between th~se two factors was not explained, 
the correct interpretation of Cooper has been debated. 
The most sensible interpretation of CooEer i s that . 
the police may search a car, with or without probable cause, if 
they have a continuing right to possess it. Justice Black, writing 
for the Court,stated: 
"It would be unreasonable to hold that the 
police, having to retain the car in their custody 
for such a length of time, had no right, even for 
their own protection, to search it .•· Id. at 61-62. 
~<~----- It is difficult to see Cooper's car as an inherently 
dangerous object, especially since he was apparently 
willing to use it at the time of arrest. But the 
reference to self-protection does seem to indicate 
that a search in furtherance of the police possessory 
interest, rather than a probable cause search for 
evidence, was seen by the Court as the central 
. . 
3. 
Depending on the circumstances in which they acquire 
possession, the police might have reason to suspect that the 
car will yield evidence of criminal activity. In inventory 
cases, however, the police seek to justify their intrusion as 
primarily based on a benign~rpose, rather than on a desire 
to uncover criminal evidence; the benign purpose might be the 
~ (~ 
~/ protection of public safety, the protection of the driver's 
property, or the protection of the police from .... ~ ...... 11a 
liability for theft. Such a purpose is thought to overcome 
a citizen's Fourth Amendment claim against the inventory on one 
of Ill two bases. First, it has been held that an inventory 
is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
E.~., Fagundes v. United States, 340 F. 2d 673 (CA 1 1965). 
Second, it has also been held that, if an inventory is a 
search, it is reasonable even without a warrant. E.~., State v. 
Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P. 2d 517 (1968). 
The basis for the argument that a station house inventory 
is not a search is essentially that the Fourth Amendment applies 
only to investigations to discover criminal evidence. Some 
support for this approach may be found in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 
709 (1972), which held that a horne visit by a welfare social 
worker was not a search "in the Fourth Amendment meaning of that 
(footnote continued} 
feature of the case. On that basis, it is hard to see 
what Qrobable cause would add to a possessory right in 
justifying the intrusion. Rather, Coo~er~ in Justice 
BreQnan's P.hrase staQds for the propo 1h~on that the 
pol~ce, un~er a forfe~ture statute, are authorized to 
treat the car in their custody as if it were their own." 
OGdy v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 453 (1973)(dissenting). 
4. 
term." Id. at 317. The Court found that such an intrusion 
into the home was rehabilitative, and not investigative in a 
criminal sense. 
Wyman's suggestion that only investigative searches 
are covered by the Fourth Amendment is unpersuasive. Terry v. 
Ohio, 393 U.S. 1 (1967), although it dealt with a "frisk" 
in an investigative context, indicated that even those not --
suspected of crime have protected Fourth Amendment interests: 
"[T]he s ounder course is to recognize that the 
Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents 
of the public on personal security, and to make it 
the scope of the particular intrusion . . • a 
central element in the analysis of reasonableness." 
Id. at 18, n. ' 15. 
A citizen's interest in "personal security," which is 
the language seemingly invoked by the language of the Amendment 
has at its foundation more than a mere desire to avoid criminal 
prosectuion. I would hold, therefore, that an inventory ------------.. 
search. 
I~_..-.... 
* The Court held alternatively that, if it was a 
search, it was reasonable. 400 U.S. at 318-324. 
** Moreover, the existence of remedies against 
unreasonable searches in other than criminal contexts is possible. 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U~S. 388 (1971). 
5. 
Assuming that you agree with this conclusion, two 
further issues are raised: (1) are there good reasons for 
dispensing with the warrant requirement, and (2) whether the 
resultant warrantless search is reasonable. 
The most relevant decision of this Court is Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). In Cady the police arrested 
an off-duty policeman for drunken driving after a late night 
accident. A search of the car, after it was towed to a private 
garage, was conducted to discover the revolver which the 
arresting officers thought Dombrowski was required to carry. 
In the process, the police uncovered blood-stained objects 
which led to Dombrowski's conviction for murder. Id. at 435-439. 
The Court accepted the district court's finding that 
the routine search was not carried out for the purpose of the 
discovery of criminal evidence. The Court held that warrantless ---searches are permissible to discharge "community caretaking 
functions," Id. at 99, and found the search of Dombrowski's car 
justified by the "concern for the safety of the general public 
who might be endangered if an intruder removed a revolver from 
the trunk of the vehicle." Id at 447. 
Dombrowski thus holds that warrants are not required 
searches conducted with a benign purpose. This is equivalent 
to the statement that the warrant requirement contained in 
the second clause ofthe Fourth Amendment applies only to criminal 
investigations. Considerable support can be marshalled for 
this interpretation. Warrants may only be issued upon probable 
cause, which has usually been thought to connote a reasonable 
s uspicion that criminal evidence will be found. In addition, 
the jus tification for a warrant has often been based on the 
idea that the search for criminal evidence gives rise to special 
temptations for offensive activity by the police. "Its 
protection consists in requiring that those inferences [regarding 
probable cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate 
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
*~ 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 
, Dombrowski thus makes the need for a warrant turn on 
the intent of the police in conducting the search, and indicates 
that intent is a question of fact to be determined in each case. 
The implications of Dombrowski for more common sorts of inventory 
cases would appear clear. Where, as with the inventory of a car 
I 
towed for a parking violatio~ (this case~ the benign purpose 
* is patent, no warrant should be required. 
Even if there are good reasons for dispensing with 
* A more difficult problem in determining intent 
would be posed by a car search following the driver's arrest for 
a crime which seems to be unconnected to the vehicle itself. 
Because intent poses a ~ctual issue of great difficulty, the 
possibility of pretext is real; the inquiry will be especially 
difficult when the police department has a standard procedure 
of inventorying all vehicles which come into custody. 
~f(r ~\s61 ~(;-\-t~ '""~ ~~ ·N\ ·,~ · ,~ ~ 
~t ~\s·~~~~ ~ v8<~~~~~ 
~flv.Jl.~~~ 'i:.~~  
7. 
warrants in benign purpose searches, there is the further 
issue whether such searches are reasonable. The search in 
Dombrowski was held as reasonable because the danger to public 
safety outweighed the driver's interest in the privacy of 
his car's contents. The police reasonably believed that 
the car contained a loaded gun, and in a small rural 
police district it would have been difficult to post a guard 
to assure that the gun did not fall into the hands of someone 
who might misuse it. More generally, four other benign 
purposes have been isolated: protection of the police from 
danger, the avoidance of police liability for lost or stolen 
property, protection of police reputation from false claims, 
and the protection of the owner's property as a service to 
The safety interest is at best a make-weight argument. 
Barring special circumstances, it is difficult to imagine a 
situation in which failure to conduct an inventory would result 
* in physical harm to the police. The liability issue is 
* If police have reasonable cause to suspect that a 
bomb is present in a car, then they of course should be able 





stronger as police departments do receive complaints and claims 
concerning property missing from stored cars. As far as legal 
liability is concerned, however, a constitutional determination 
'--
that the police were not allowed to go further than locking 
th doors of a towed auto would seem conclusive as to their 
duties as bailees. More important, at least as to the search 
under consideration, here the South Dakota Supreme Court has 
already told us that as a matter of state law, the police will 
not be held liable if they lock the car and pick up "plain-view" 
items. 
j 
The protection of the driver's property is a significant 
interest for both the policeman and the citizen. It has been 
contended that an inventory is unnecessary for this purpose, 
since rolling up the windows and locking the doors gives the 
owner all the protection that the contents of his car ever have 
in normal use. It seems clear, however, that while owners might 
leave things of value in cars temporarily, they would not 
normally do so for the many days that police custody might last. 
Hence, there is a real gain in the protection of property 
if cars are inventoried and valuable items are removed for storage. 
The same gain could be provided, of course, by posting a guard 
at the police lot where the car might be stored; but that could 
be prohibitively expensive, especially for smaller jurisdictions. 
Against this gain in security for property must be 
weighed the violation of secrecy that an inventory implies. One 
9. 
element to be considered in such a determination is the 
possibility that there might be no property to protect. The 
police in a normal inventory case, unlike the situation in 
Dombrowski, will have no reasonable belief as tot he car's 
contents. Another factor is that, even for a towed 
vehicle, the police will usi ually be able to ascertain the -
owner, who will often be in a position to protect the 
*' ~ f;;:fvr ~ property himself, if he wishes. · A third is that property 
fft'~~..Jh' loss is an insurable loss, whereas a violation of privacy 
~~· ~ is not. When the police cannot locate the owner, and have 
1--vfO ~ 




reason to believe that the car contains valuable objects, 
perhaps they are justified in searching it. As a routine 
matter, however, it would seem that the protection of ..._______ 
privacy is more important than the possibility of preventing 
theft. This rule, that special circumstances must be shown to 
justify a warrantless inventory, is the one that I recommend 
you vote to adopt. I would thus draw a "bright line" 
* Petitioners spend a good deal of tLme arguing how 
insignificant the privacy interest is in an automobile while 
simultaneously contending that there is a significant possibility 
that valuable personal property may be stored in the hidden reaches 
of the vehicle. This pos itiop is somewhat inco~nt. I think 
the fact that many people place property that they consider 
important in their glove compartment or trunk illustrates that 
they believe those areas will be free from intrusion, both by 
thieves or anyone else. Much in this case turns on the perceptions 
one holds about the role of the automobile in our society. It is 
my impression that many people treat their cars as an extension of 
their homes: they cram it with stereo, books, clothes or other items 
that fit their individual life style. Any invasion of the hidden 
areas of their cars is an intrusive look into an aspect of their 
lives that they have a legitimate right, a bsent special 
circumstances, to keep free from view. 
-
between the exposed interior reaches of the passenger 
compartment and the glove compartment, trunk, or other 
10. 
areas that are hidden from view. The issue is very close 
and rather subjective, and an opposite result is certainly 
defensible. 
Greg 
* Petitioners attempt to distinguish the trunk from 
an unlocked glove compartment. I don't accept the distinction 
since in order to enter the glove compartment illegally, one must 
first braaL into the car. It is concededly harder to break 
into a trunk, but that hardly serves a basis on which to turn 
the law. (If pressed, however, I would urge as a fQJ.. ll~ack 
~ position the locked glove compartment/unlocked glove compartment distinction: the locking of the compartment is an affirmative act (in contrast most domestic car trunks lock automatically) 
arguably indicating the owner of the vehiele wishes to keep 
something hidden, (on the other hand, it also indicates something 
valuable may be inside.) 
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March 30, 1976 
75-76 SOUTH DAKOTA v. OPPERMAN 
Miscellaneous Thoughts, Dictated in Preparation for the Conference: 
1. An inventory search is for a benign purpose - not 
to uncover evidence of crime. 
2. I am inclined to think it is a "search" within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
3. But the warrant clause certainly does not apply; 
nor is "probable cause" a prerequisite. 
4. The question is whether the inventory is reasonable 
under the circumstances, and in light of the state interest 
implicated. There are two primary "state interests" (i) 
protect personal property left within the car; and (ii) 
protect the police in their role as bailees. 
5. Valuables in "plain view" will usually justify action 
to safeguard these. This would not necessarily justify opening 
a locked glove compartment or the trunk. 
6. An element in the "reasonableness" of the inventory 
search may be the length of time in which the vehicle is in 
police custody. In this case, the custory extended only 
during one day. In larger cities, and under varying circum-
stances, custody could be more or less indefinite. A police 
department rule deferring the inventory search (absent "clear 
view" items) might withhold the inventory for, say, 48 hours 
to allow the owner to claim the vehicle. Such a rule, however, 
2. 
would make little sense if the car had a foreign license, 
were involved in an accident and abandoned, or if there were 
evidence that the car was stolen. 
My inclination is to avoid "bright lines", as reasonable-
ness - by its very nature - depends on the facts and circum-
stances. Yet, again especially in large cities where several 
thousand cars may be picked up each week, bright lines must 
be drawn at least for purposes of administration. If the 
vehicles are parked in a reasonably safe location (~·&·, 
on police protected property, as distinguished from some 
public parking lot to which they have been towed), I would 
think a 48-hour rule would make sense. 
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meaning of the Fourth .Amendment. 
3. But the warrant clause certainly does not apply; 
nor is "probable cause" a prerequisite. 
4. The question is whether the inventory is reasonable 
under the circumstances, and in light of the state interest 
implicated. There are two primary "state interests" (i) 
protect personal property left within the car; and (ii) 
protect the police in their role as bailees. 
5. Valuables in "plain view" will usually justify action 
to safeguard these. This would not necessarily justify opening 
a locked glove compartment or the trunk. 
6. An element in the "reasonableness" of the inventory 
search may be the length of time in which the vehicle is in 
police custody. In this case, the custory extended only 
during one day. In larger cities, and under varying circum-
stances, custody could be more or less indefinite. A police 
department rule deferring the inventory search (absent "clear 
view" items) might withhold the inventory for, say, 48 hours 




would make little sense if the car had a foreign license, 
were involved in an accident and abandoned, or if there were 
evidence that the car was stolen. 
* * * * 
My inclination is to avoid "bright lines", as reasonable-
ness - by its very nature - depends on the facts and circum-
stances. Yet, again especially in large cities where several 
thousand cars may be picked up each week, bright lines must 
be drawn at least for purposes of administration. If the 
vehicles are parked in a reasonably safe location ~·&·• 
on police protected property, as distinguished from some 
public parking lot to which they have been towed), I would 
think a 48-hour rule would make sense. 
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CHAMI!IERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
May 26, 1976 
Re: 7 5-7 6 - South Dakota v. Opperman 
Dear Bill: 
I am happy to oblige by inserting (necessary or not) 
after "Constitution" on line 3, page 1 (typewritten draft), the 
words ''as applicable to the State of South Dakota under the 
14th Amendment. '' 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
t 
C HAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.:§uprtntt Q}mtrl af1!rt ~th ;§fattg 
·~lhtglfingtort. ~. "f. 2IJ~)l,~ 
May 26, 1976 
Re: No. 75-76 - South Dakota v. Opperman 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. As a matter of nomenclature, would 
it not be better to refer to the constitutional provisions 
in question as the "Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments" rather 
than simply the Fourth Amendment, since they are being 
applied to a state in this case? 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Greg Palm 
Re: The Chief Justice's Opinion in South Dakota v. Opperman 
(No. 75-76) 
Although you voted to "affirm" at Conference I would urge 
you to reconsider your vote and circulate a memorandum to the 
effect that you are waiting to see what the dissent has to say 
(note, however, that there has yet been no dissent assigned; 
apparently the other justices are waiting to see if the 
Chief's opinion gets a Court) . since you are not yet at rest 
in this case. Alternatively, I could draft a dissent or conanrexe 
After Conference I never really got a chance to talk 
to you about this case. Apparently you have opted for 
distinguishing between the trunk--locked glove compartment 
and the unlocked glove compartment--rest of the car. After 
giving the matter more thought I really do not believe there 
is any really satisfactory way to distinguish between an 
unlocked and locked glove compartment: the key idea in terms 
of privacy expectations is that any item plaeed in a glove 
compartment or trunk is hidden from view--thus, the expectation 
of privacy in that area is greater than in the other areas of 
the car. Under this view the police could inventory the 
car if, in looking through the windows, they spotted items 
of potential value--ie. brief case, ca~era, or alike. It 
would then become reasonable for them to open the car and 
to secure the property. 
We would then affirm this case since the contraband was 
discovered in the unlocked glove compartment. I recognize that 
at some point the police should have the right to look further--
with the hope of discovering additional clues to ownership. 
Exactly how long that period is need not be answered in this 
case: a footnote indicating merely that at some point--a week 
or so--it would become reasonable for the police to look 
further is sufficient. ((Note: the police have no real need to 




has no license plates since the/ can be used to lead the 
police to all of the data potentially found on the registration 
that may/may not be in the glove compartment) ). Moreover, 
there obviously exist special fact situations where such 
inventories may be appropriate--ie. car is obviously stolen 
(of course, an argument could be made in a later case that 
in those special situations one still needs a warrant prior 
to entry). 
Even if you disagree with the above(in that you 
believe open glove compartments are different from locked 
ones) I do not believe that you can join the Chief's opinion 
both in view of your own past opinions and what you are writing 
in the border search cases. The principal problem with the 
opinion is its revival of the "reasonableness standard" as the 
key test in the Fourth Amendment area. See, ~' T.O. at 10 
("the reasonableness standard adopted by the Framers"; the 
quotation of Black and Cooper). Although the opinion does 
mention the warrant requiremen~, , it does so only once at p.4--
the context is that the Court has approved warrantless searches 
of car s in situations in which a search of home or office would 
be illegal: the implication is that searches of cars without 
a warrant is always O.K.--this is not what the law is and I 
doubt if you would want it that way((Note that it would make the 
discussion in the border search cases of the warrant question 
rather off the point)). This implication is not clearly the 
only one derivable: . but unless the Chief makes clear that 
all the Court intends to say in this case is that no warrant 
is necessary in the inventory search context, I would not join 
the opinion. [[[An even more dangerous implication of the 
opinion is that the discredited Rabinowitz test of "reasonablene5' 
is applicable everywhere: since the opinion does differentiate 
however, 
between cars and houses at p.4,/the most reasonable implication 
to be derived from the general discussion in § (3) at p. 10 
is that it is limited to cars--but I think that the Chief should 
make this clear.]]] 
There are several other proh~ems that I have with the 
-3-
opinion, most of which stem from the fact it never attempts 
to tell us why warrants are not required in the inventory 
search situation: as indicated in my original memorandum I 
" 
think that one can make a defensible argument that the concepts 
of probable cause and warrants have no real place here. There - - ,__ ~.-. -is no need for a det~hed magistrate to evaluate anything. 
All that the police want to do is to search a car based on their 
standard operating procedures: thereis nothing for the 
magistrate to evaluate; once the police have the car that is 
------~ z::wa...., • 
enough. ((There is some need, however, to distinguish the 
administrative search cases where- warrants have been 
required)i). The opinion, however, makes no effort to 
explain why a warrant is not required here: the mobility of 
cars and the lesser expectation of privacy have little to 
do with whether a warrant of some type is necessary. Instead, 
the opinion treats the past cases as if they point inexprably 
to the decision that we have reached. But they do not clearly 
do so, and instead of attempting to ~gically)analyze this cas jf
1 
the opinion slightly bends the meaning of the past decisions: 
1. At p. 5 the Chief cites Cardwell as a 
statement by the Court that there is a lesser privacy interest 
in cars. I think that we can agree that that is a correct 
statement as to the view of a majority of the Court ~' but the 
Cardwell ............ ~*· quote is not from an opinion of 
the Court. Only a plurality of 4 joined Justice Blackmun's 
opinion. You wrote separately concurring in the judgment on 
Bustamonte grounds. 
2. At p. 11 the use of Cooper is deceptive: the 
clear implication of the paragraph and the quote is that "such 
of length of time" refers to the week, when in fact, if you 
read the quote in context it is referring to the 4-month 
inteval prior to the forfeiture sale. In fact, read correctly, 
it reaffirms the idea that in Cooper the Court viewed the sale 
as a fairly certain event--the police would be required to 
hold the car the four months(((Note that even if one week were 
correct, it would have little relevance here: the police here 
searched immediately; had they waited a day or two, the owner 




3. FN. 9 and its "protective reasons" implications 
is cute, but makes the entire opinion seem less persuasive 
(the difference between rolling up the windows of a car in 
the rain and then locking it 
rather great). 
and this case is 
4. The interpretation of Cady is also troubling. The 
opinion emphasizes one line in that opinion where the policemen'~ 
belief that there would be a gun in the trunk is stated as 
an "impression"--as if there was only the vaguest notion of 
this being the case and as if in Cady the Court considered this 
fact of marginal importance only. But, at other points in 
the opinion the impression is stated as a belief and, more 
important, in the critical sentence of the opinion where the 
holding is stated, the operative phrase is: "reasonably 
believed"to conta~n a gun. See 413 U.S. at 448. 
Obviously, points 1 to 4 are in most cases no 
reason not to join an opinion where you agree with tre 
result and there are no implications for other cases. But 
car-search cases are likely to come up in other cases and 
what is said here may have bearing on them. Moreover, it 
is disconcerting to see precident used the way it is in this 
opinion. 
A final point: with regard to the problems that 
I have with the lack of a warrant clause discussion and the 
implications for the general approach to be applied in the 
Fourth Amendment area, please take a look at your opinion in 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 u.s. 297, 
315 (1972). You there clearly reject the Rabinowitz "all 
the circumstances--reasonableness test": the Chief's opinion 
does not cite Rabinowitz, but it does quote much language from 
Cooper--which reiles on R--and until recently many scholars 
thought that the ~ "reasonableness" approach of Cooper 
was an unexplained deviation from this Court's Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
Even if you agree with the result, we thus have several 
-5-
options which you may want to discuss 'with me: concur in the 
result and write separately; wait and see what the dissent says 
and how the Chief responds(no response is the likely one); 
have me modify his opinion and see if he takes the changes ••••• 
I'm happy to talk whenever you want. "' 
Greg 
I. -"''' ~~"~ -\-o c:.\.ec.~ ~e n~\efs. ~ c-ec:~ ~co~ 
-\a ~ ~ ~ ~ -~~"'5;1" ~ ~o\\c.e ~~~~~ 
~~V\c; ~ ~e~ ~. 
I 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~u:puntt afttttrl of tfrt ~b ~tafts 
'm IUl fri:ngLrn. ~. ~· 21lE''l ~ 
June 1, 197 6 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 75-76 -- South Dakota v. Donald Opperman 







TO: Greg Palm DATE: June 2, 1976 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
South Dakota v. Opperman 
I would appreciate your drafting a concurring opinion in 
the above case. 
I am in accord with much of what you have said about the 
CJ 1 s opinion. Since he may well need my vote for a "Court", 
and I have a sense of institutional responsibility to try to 
avoid being the vote that prevents a "Court", I would like a 
draft generally along the following lines: 
I would join the Court's opinion on the basis of my under-
standing (my reading of it) that the .. language in the opinion 
emphasizing the "reasonableness standard" is addressed to the 
inventory search at issue in this case. I would make clear that 
absent exigent circumstances the warrant requirement normally 
applies to automobiles. I said as much in Almeida-Sanchez 
and - as you indicated - I declined to adopt the "reasonableness 
standard" as the sole requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
I do think it is perfectly reasonable for police to have 
a policy (whether written in a formal regulation or uniformly 
followed with approval of appropriate authorities) to invent0ry 




I see no reason to require a warrant as the concept of probable 
cause is irrelevant. As you noted, there really is nothing 
for the magistrate to evaluate once the vehicle is in police 
custody. 
I see no reason, in a brief concurring opinion, to get 
into distinctions between locked and unlocked glove compart-
ments. In my view, given the presence of valuable objects 
in plain view, the police were justified in the search. Indeed, 
apart from breaking and entering locked glove compartments and 
trunks, I think people who desert automobiles on the streets 
have no basis to complain if the police take a look inside. 
But this is an easy case, as there were special reasons here 
imposing an obligation to safeguard valuables. 
I would like to make the concurrence fairly conclusory. 
My object is to maintain a consistent position and keep options 
open for the future. Yet, I think the result reached in this 
case is correct and in accord with the overwhelming weighf of 
authority. It also is in accord with a police practice which 
seems to me generally to be in the public interest. A law-
abiding citizens (who doesn't have heroin in his glove compart-
ment or a hand grenade tucked under the seat) should welcome 
precautions of this kind. I do think an automobile, in this 
context, is quite different from a house or a mobile home. 
I also think there is a lesser expectation of privacy - as I 
have said recently in the border partrol cases - with respect 
to automobiles under almost every conceivable circumstances. 
If you can find the time to draft this (not over three 
or four pages I hope) fairly promptly, I wi ll not write the 
Chief a note. I expect that a note would prompt him to make 









TO: Greg Palm DATE: June 2, 1976 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr . 
\· -' 
South Dakota v. Opperman 
I would appreciate your drafting a concurring opinion in 
the above case. 
I am in accord with much of what you have said about the 
CJ's opinion. Since he may well need my vote for a "Court", 
and I have a sense of institutional responsibility to try to 
avoid being the vote that prevents a "Court", I would like a 
draft generally along the following lines: 
I would join the Court's opinion on the basis of my under- , 
standing (my reading of it) that the l language in the opinion 
emphasizing the "reasonableness standard" is addressed to the 
inventory search at issue in this case. I would make clear that 
absent exigent circumstances the warrant requirement normally 
applies to automobiles. I said as much in Almeida-Sanchez 
and - as you indicated - I declined to adopt the "reasonableness 
standard" as the sole requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
I do think it is perfectly reasonable for police to have 
a policy (whether written in a formal regulation or uniformly 
followed with approval of appropriate authorities to invent~y 
the contents of a car that the police lawfully take into custody. 
t., 
2. 
I see no reason to require a warrant as the concept of probable 
cause is irrelevant. As you noted, there really is nothing 
for the magistrate to evaluate once the vehicle is in police 
custody. 
I see no reason, in a brief concurring opinion, to get 
into distinctions between locked and unlocked glove compart-
ments. In my view, given the presence of valuable objects 
in plain view, the police were justified ~n the search. Indeed, 
apart from breaking and entering locked glove compartments and 
trunks, I think people who desert automobiles on the streets 
have no basis to complain if the police take a look.~ inside. 
But this is an easy case, as there were special reasons here 
imposing an obligation to safeguard valuables. 
I would like to make the concurrence fai~ly conclusory. 
~ My object is to maintain . a consistent position and keep options 
open for the future. Yet, I think the result reached in this 
case is correct and in accord with the overwhelming weigh of 
authority. It also is in accord with a police practice which 
seems to me general}y to be in the public interest. A law-
abiding citizens (who doesn't have heroin in his glove compart-
ment or a hand grenade tucked under the seat) should welcome 
precautions of this kind. I do think an automobile, in this 
context, is quite different from a house or a mobile home. 
I also think there is a lesser expectation of privacy - as I 
have said recently in the border parbrol cases - with respect 





If you can find the time to draft this (not over three 
or four pages I hope) fairly promptly, I will not write the 
Chief a note. I expect that a note would prompt him to make 
some minor changes that may not fully preserve my position. 




JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
,ju.vrmu Qtll'Urlllf flr.t ~.tb ,jtat.ts 
Jl'MJrittghttt. ~. <If. 2ll~'!~ 
June 4, 1976 
Re: No. 75~76 - South Dakota v. Opperman 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 





TO: Greg Palm 
FROM: ~,. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Opperman 
I think your proposed concurring opinion is very good 
indeed. ~ 
1' 
Apart from a few minor editing changes, and a rider for 
the last half page or so, I have only one specific comment: 
I would like for you to condense substantially yQur. 
description of the governmental and societal interests on 
pages 7 and 8. ~ Without having reexamined the Chief's opinion, 
my recollection is that he pretty well covered - at some 
length - these interests. , Perhaps it would suffice, at the 
end of the first full sentence on page 7 (the sentence that 
ends with the words "police custody"), to add a conclusory 
sentence along the following lines: 
"As the Court's opinion makes clear, each of these 
interests - in varying degrees - normally is implicated ., ~. 
in an inventory search. In total, these are substantial 
and legitimate state interests." ;~' ·':/' 
-~· 
I think you can "· still leave footnote 6 {possibly condensed) 
·~ 
in the opinion, as a note, and also find an appropriate place · 
to refer to the Harvard Law Review note. 
* * * * 
.. 
In Part I of the draft you do cite· a~l of my prior 
"warrant clause" cases. ·.~ I wonder whether you could not 
2 • 
substitute a quotation from one of them<~·&·, U.S. District 
Court or Almeida-Sanchez) what I have said about the warrant 
clause in the past, rather than quoting from Camara or someone 
opinion? 
* * * 
My desire, evidenced by comments a's to the last few pages 
of your draft, to reduce the length of this. concurrence is 
prompted - in part - by the observation being made by several 
of my Brothers that all of us are tending to be too discursive 
in our concurring and dissenting opinions, especially at this 
season of the year. 
* * * 
As I do not wish to delay circulation, I suggest the 
following procedure: As soon as you have made the changes · 
indicated by me, have Sally or Gail (if available) and if 
not have the secretarial pool, do a double-spaced, short · 
paper copy of the opinion that can be xeroxed and circulated 
the Confe~ence by Monday afternoon. 
I have dictated a coveetig letter which I have dated 




concurring opinion. The letter will not go to the Conference. 
If at least one of your colleagues has not already read 
the draft, both for substance and form, we must be sure 
this step is taken before the printed draft is circulated • .;·· 




.:.. t. ",• 
June 
No. 75-76 South Dakota v. Opperman 
Dear Chief: 
I enclose a copy of a concurring opinion 
case. 
You will note that I am joining your opinion, thus 
assuring - I believe - that you have a Court. 
It was necessary for me to write because, as you will 
recall, you and I differ as to the role and importance of 
the "warrant clause" in the Fourth Amendment. What I have 
written in the past might be construed as inconsistent with 
the rather general treatment of "reasonableness" in your 
opinion. Accordingly, I felt it necessary to restate my 





.Ju.p:rmtt <!):ltltrl ct t4t ~a .Jtattg 
'Jias4htght~ ~. <!):. 2llbi~;l 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.. 
June 15, 1976 
PERSONAL 
Re: 75-76 - South Dakota v. Opperman 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for your note and concurrence. 
. .. ,. 
With deference I cannot agree that any additional writing 
is ''necessary'' but the combination of Article III and the 
First Amendment guarantees your right-to-write ! I have 
tried to deal with your concerns by an addition to Note 5 
(enclosed). 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
June 15, 1976 
Re: 75-76 - South Dakota v. Opperman 
!i_/ (addition) 
In view of the noncriminal context of inventory searches, 
and the inapplicability in such a setting of the requirement of 
probable cause, courts have held -- and quite correctly -- that 
search warrants are not required, linked as the warrant re-
quirement textually is to the probable-cause concept. We have 
frequently observed that the warrant requirement assures that 
legal inferences and conclusions as to probable cause will be 
drawn by a neutral magistrate unrelated to the criminal in-
vestigative-enforcement process. With respect to noninvestiga-
tive police inventories of automobiles lawfully within governmental 
custody, however, the policies that support the warrant require-




..iltp"rtmt Qfourl of Hrt~~ .i\taftg 
Jfuqmght~ ~. <If. 21l.?~~ 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
June 16, 1976 
Re: 75-76- South Dakota v. Opperman 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I have made a slight addition to note 5, page 6 
so that it will read as follows: 
5/ 
In view of the noncriminal context of inventory 
searches, and the inapplicability in such a setting of the 
requirement of probable cause, courts have held --
and quite correctly -- that search warrants are not 
required, linked as the warrant requirement textually 
is to the probable-cause concept. We have frequently 
observed that the warrant requirement assures that 
legal inferences and conclusions as to probable cause will 
be drawn by a neutral magistrate unrelated to the criminal 
investigative-enforcement process. With respect to 
noninvestigative police inventories of automobiles lawfully 
within governmental custody, however, the policies that 
support the warrant requirement, to which Mr. Justice 
Powell refers, are inapplicable. 
Re~ f3 
CHAMBERS OF 
-JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~tnu <!fmttt o-f tqt ~ttiftb' ~hdtg 
~MJri:ttgtllt4 l9. Qf. 2llgt~~ 
June 21, 1976 
Re: No. 75-76 - South Dakota v. Opperman 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
~u:prtmt (!j:omt of tlrt ~~ ~httt.&' 
Jl'ag'.£rittghtn. ~. <!J:. 2lJ,?J.I,~ 
CHAMI3ERS OF 
..JUSTICE ..JOHN PA~ STEVENS 
June 22, 1976 
Re: 75-76 - South Dakota v. Opperman 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Ju~tice 
Copies to the Conference 
,, 
.:§u:prttttt <Q:cu:rt of tqt 2ffnittb j;tatts 
~asfri:nghm. tB. <q:. ZOe?'!~ 
CHAM BERS OF" 
.JUSTICE WM . .J . BRENNAN . .JR. 
June 28, 1976 
RE: No. 75-76 South Dakota v. Opperman 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me in the dissenting opinion you 
have prepared in the above. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
CHAM6ERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.§nprtntt Q}ottrl of tltt ~~ .§ta:ftg 
:Jilaglfi:nghtn. ~. <!f. 2ll.;TJ.1~ 
June 28, 1976 
Re: 75-76 -South Dakota v. Opperman 
Dear Thurgood: 
I will add the following as a footnote to my opinion: 
_I 
The "consent" theory advanced by the 
dissent rests on the assumption that the search 
is exclusively for the protection of the car owner. 
It is not; the protection of the municipality and th,e 
officers from claims and the protection of the public 
from vandals who might find a firearm, Cody v. 
Dombrowski, supra, or as here, contraband 
drugs, o.'?~ C ('I.a.<:' ial. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 








































































































































































































































No. 75-76 SOUTH DAKOTA v. OPPERMAN 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
While I join the opinion of the Court, I add this 
opinion to express additional views as to why the search 
conducted in this case is valid under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. This inquiry involves two distinct 
questions: (i) whether routine inventory searches are 
impermissible, and (ii) if not, whether they must be 
conducted pursuant to a warrant. 
I. 
The central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safe-
guard the privacy and security of individuals against 
arbitrary invasions by government officials. See,~·&·, 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); 
• 
2. 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). None 
of our prior decisions is dispositive of the issue whether 
1 
the Amendment permits routine inventory "searches" of 
2 
automobiles. Resolution of this question requires a weighing 
of the governmental and societal interests advanced to 
justify such intrusions against the constitutionally 
protected interest of the individual citizen in the privacy 
of his effects. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, U.S. 
___ , ___ (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 
supra, at 878-879 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 
891, 892 (1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 447-448 
(1973); Terry v . . Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968). Cf. 
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 534-535. As noted 
in the Court's opinion, see~ at ___ , three interests 
generally have been advanced in support of inventory searches: 
(i) protection of the police from danger; (ii) protection 
of the police against claims and disputes over lost or 
stolen property;(iii) protection of the owner's property 
while it remains in police custody~Except in rare cases, 
there is little danger associated with impounding unsearched 
automobiles. But the occasional danger that may exist 
cannot be discounted entirely, see Cooper v. California, 
385 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967). iince-,u;e harmful consequences 
in those rare cases may be· great, and there does not appear 
f I I 1 
l 
3. 
to be any effective way of identifying in advance those 
circumstances or classes of automobile impoundments which 
represent a greater risk. Society also has an important 
interest in minimizing the number of false claims filed 
against police since they may diminish the community's 
respect for law enforcement generally and lower department 
3 
morale, thereby impairing the effectiveness of the police. 
It is not clear, however, how effective inventories are as 
a means of discouraging fa l se claims, since such claims 
need only be accompanied by an assertion that an item was 
stolen prior to the inventory or was intentionally omitted 
from the police records. 
The protection of the ownner's property is a significant 
interest for both the policeman and the citizen. It 
is argued that an inventory is not necessary since 
locked doors and rolled-up windows afford the same protection 
4 
that the contents of a parked automobile normally .enjoy. 
But many owners might leave valuables in their automobile 
temporarily that they would not leave there unattended for 
the several days that police custody may last. There is thus 
a substantial gain in security if automobiles are invent oried 
and valuable items removed for storage. And, while the 
same se·curity could be attained by posting a guard at the 
storage lot, that alternative may be prohibitively expensive, 
5 




Against these interests must be weighed the citizen's 
interest in the privacy of the contents of his automobile. 
I 
Although the expectation of privacy in an automobile is 
I 
significantly less than the traditional expectation of 
I 
privacy associated with the home, United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, supra at ; United States J. Ortiz, supra, at 
876 n. 2; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417U.S. 583, 590-591 (1974) 
I 
(plurality opinion), the unrestrained search of an auto-
mobile and its contents in many circumstances would 
constitute a serious intrusion upon the privacy of the 
individual. But such a search is not at issue in this case. 
As the Court's opinion emphasizes, the search here was 
limited to an inventory of the unoccupied automobile and 
was conducted strictly in accord with the regulations of 
6 
the Vermillion Police Department. Upholding searches of 
this type thu~ provides no general license for the police 
7 
to examine the contents of such automobiles. 
I agree with the Cou~that the Constitution 
permits routine inventory searches, and turn next to the 
question whether they must be conducted pursuant to a 
warrant. 
II. 
While the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly in terms 
8 





of this Court have recognized that the definition of 
"reasonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more specific 
dictates of the warrant clause. See United States v. United 
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967); Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S., at 528. As the Court explained in Katz v. 
United States, supra, at 357, "[s]earches conducted without 
warrants have been held unlawful 'notwithstanding facts 
unquestionably showing probable cause,' Agnello v. United 
States, 269 U. S. 20, 33 for the Constitution requires 'that 
the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer 
. be interposed between the citizen and the police .• 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S .. 471, 481-482." Thus, 
although "[s]ome have argued that '[t]he relevant test is 
not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, 
but whether the search was reasonable, United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950), ... [t]his view has 
not been accepted." United States v. United States District 
Court, supra, at 315 and n. 16. See Chimel v. California, 
395 U.S. 752 (1969). Except in a few carefully defined 
classes of cases, a search of private property without valid 
consent is "unreasonable 11 unless it has been authorized by 
a valid search warrant. See,~·&·, Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269 (1973); Stoner v. California, 
376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
' I 
6. 
U.S., at 528; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 
(1951); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). 
Although the Court has validated warrantless searches 
of automobiles in circumstances that would not justify a 
search of a home or office, Cady v. Dombrowski, supra; 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), these decisions establish no 
general "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement. 
See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). Rather, 
they demonstrate that "'for the purpose of the Fourth Amend-
ment there is a constitutional difference between houses 
and cars,'" Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S., at 439, quoting 
Chambers v. Marone~, supra, at 52, a difference that may 
. 9 
in some cases justify a warrantless search. 
The routine inventory search under consideration in 
this case does not fall within any of the established 
10 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. But examination 
of the interests which are protected by conditioning searches 
on warrants issued by a judicial officer reveals that none 
of these is implicated here. A warrant may only issue 
upon "probable cause". In the criminal context the require-
ment of a warrant thus protects the individual's legitimate 
expectation of privacy against the overzealous police officer. 
"Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences 
[concerning probable cause] be drawn by a neutral and 
7 . 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
I 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
See United States Vo United States District Court, supra, 
at 316-318. Inventory searches, however, are not conducted 
I 
in order to discover evidence of crime. The officer does 
not make a discretionary determinatio~ to search based on 
I 
a judgment that certain conditions are present. Such 
searches are conducted in accordance with established police 
department rules or policy and occur whenever an automobile 
is seized. There are thus no special facts for a neutral 
magistrate to evaluate. 
A related purpose of the warrant requirement is to 
prevent hindsight from affecting the evaluation of the 







____ (1976); cf. United States v. 
____ n. 22 (1976). In the case of 
an inventory search conducted in accordance with standard 
police department procedures, there ·.is no significant 
danger of hindsight justification. The absence of a warrant 
. will not impair the effectiveness of post-search review of 
the reasonableness of a particular inventory-search. 
Warrants also have been required outside the context 
of a criminal investigation. In Camara v. Municipal Cour~, 
.. 
8. 
387 U.S. 523, the Court held that, absent consent, a warrant 
was necessary to conduct an areawide building code inspection, 
even though the search could be made absent cause to believe 
that there were violations in the particular buildings being 
searched. In requiring a warrant the Court emphasized that 
"[t]he practical effect of [the existing warrantless search 
procedures had been] to leave the occupant subject to the 
discretion of the official in the field", since 
"When [an] inspector demands entry, the occupant 
ha[d] no way of knowing whether enforcement of the 
municipal code involved require[d] inspection of 
his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits 
of the inspector's power to search, and no way of 
knowing whether the inspector himself [was] acting 
under proper authorization." Id., at 532o 
In the inventory search context these concerns are absent. 
The owner or prior occupant of the automobile is neither 
present nor, in many cases, is there any real likelihood 
that he could be located within a reasonable period of time. 
More importantly, no significant discretion is placed in 
the hands of the individual officer: he usually has no 
11 
choice as to the subject of the search or as to its scope. 
In sum, I agree with the Court that the routine 
inventory search in this case is constitutional. 
' ! i 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Routine inventories of automobiles intrude upon 
an area in which the privacy citizen has a "reasonable 
expectation of privacy". Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 360 (1969)(Harlan, J.)(concurring). Thus, despite 
their benign purpose, when conducted by government officials 
they constitute "searches" for purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 n. 15 (1967); United 
States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (CAS 1973); Mazzetti v. 
Superior Court , 4 Cal. 3d 699, 709m710, 484 P.2d 84, 90-91 
(en bane). 
/ Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974) 
(plurality opinion) 
2. The principal decisions relied on by the State ·· to 
justify the inventory search in this case, Harris v. United 
States, 390 U. S. 234 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 
U.S. 58 (1967), and Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), 
each relied in part on significant factors not found here. 
Harris only involved an application of the "plain view" 
doctrine. In Cooper the Court validated an automobile 
search one week after the vehicle was impounded on the 
basis that the police had a possessory interest in it based 
on a state forfeiture statute requiring them to retain it 
some four months until the forfeiture sale. 386 u.s.' at 
61-62 • . Finally, in Cady the Court held that the search of 
I \,Uit.~- ~ ""'I 
c.l..-Co\Mw\~U'.S 
i of-~,~ .J 
N-2 
an automobile trunk "which the officer reasonably believed 
to contain a gun" was not unreasonable ' within the meaning 
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 413 U.S., at 448. 
See also id. at 436-437. The police in a typical inventory 
I 
search case, however, will have no reasonable belief as to 
I 
the particular automobile's contents. And, although the 
police in this case knew with certainty that there were 
I 
I 
items of personal property within the exposed interior of 
the car- i.e., the ~atch of the dashboard- seep. __ _ 
1 justification 
~' this information did not .. ~ ........ provide additional/ 
r 
for the search of the closed console glove compartment in 
which the contraband was discovered. 
3. The interest in protecting the police from liability 
for lost or stolen property is not relevant in this case. 
Respondent's motion to suppress was limited to items inside 
the automobile not in plain view. And, the Supreme Court 
of South Dakota held that the removal of objects in plain view, 
and the closing of windows and locking of doors, satisfied 
any duty the police department owed the automobile's owner 
to protect property while in police possession. __ S.D. ___ , __ 
228 N.W.2d 52,_ (1975). 
4. See Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d, at 
709-710, 484 P.2d,. at 90-91. 
5. See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of 
Automobiles, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 835, 853 (1974). 
N-3 
6. A complete "inventory report" is required of all 
vehicles impounded by the Vermillion Police Department. 
The standard inventory consists of a survey of the vehicles' 
exterior - windows, fenders, trunk, hood - apparently for 
damage, and its interior, to locate "valuables" for storage. 
As· part of each inventory a standard report form is completed. 
The report in this case listed the items discovered in both 
the automobile's interior and the unlocked glove compartment. 
The only notation regarding the trunk was that it was locked. 
A police officer testified that all impounded vehicles are 
searched, that the search always includes the glove compart-
ment, and that the trunk had not been searched in this case 
because it was locked. See App. 33-34; 73-79. 
7. As part of their inventory search the police may 
discover materials such as letters o:r checkbooks that "touch 
upon intimate areas of an individual's personal affairs," 
and "reveal much about a person's activities, associations, 
and beliefs." California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 
21, 78 (1974)(Powell, J., concurring). See also Fisher 
v. United States, ___ U.S. ___ , ___ n. 7 (1976). In this 
case the police found, inter alia, "miscellaneous papers", 
a checkbook, an installment loan book, and a social security 
status card. App. 77. There is, however, no evidence in 
the record that in carrying out their established inventory 
duties the Vermillion police do other than search for and 
N-4 
remove for storage such property, without examining its 
contents. 
8. The Amendment provides that 
"The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized." 
9. This difference turns primarily on the mobility of 
the automobile and the impractability of obtaining a warrant 
in many circumstances,~·&·, Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132, 153-154 (1925), but the lesser expectation of 
privacy in an automobile is also important. See United 
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 n. 2 (1975); Cardwell 
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion); 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 275, 279 (1973) 
(Powell, J., concurring). See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 
u.s. 433, 441-442 (1973). 
10. See, e.&., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 
294, 298-300 (1967); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58; 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-177 (1949); 
See also 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S., at 153, 156./McDonald 
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-456 (1948). 
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then recognized exceptions to warrant requirement: (i) hot 
pursuit; (ii) plain view doctrine; (iii) emergency situation; 
(iv) automobile search; (v) consent; and (vi) incident to 
arrest). 
11. In this case, for example, the officer who 
conducted the search testified that after a second ticket 
had been issued for a parking violation the offending auto-
mobile was towed to the city impound lot. The officer 
further testified that all vehicles taken to the lot are 
searched in accordance with a "standard inventory sheet" 
and "all items [discovered in the vehicle] are removed for 
safekeeping." App. 24. Seen. 6 supra • 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
While I join the opinion of the Court, I add this opin-
ion to express additional views as to why the search con-
ducted in this case is valid under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. This inquiry involves two 
distinct questions: (i) whether routine inventory searches 
are impermissible, and (ii) if not, whether they must be 
conducted pursuant to a warrant, 
I 
The central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to 
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against 
arbitrary invasions by government officials. See, e. g., 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 
(1975); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 
(1967) . None of our prior decisions is dispositive of 
the issue whether the Amendment permits routine in~ 
ventory "searches" 1 of automobiles.2 Resolution of this 
1 Routine inventories of automobiles intrude upon an area in which 
t he privacy citizen has a "reasonable expectation of privacy." 
'Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1969) (Harlan, J.) (con~ 
curring) . Thus, despite their benign purpose, when conducted by 
government officials they constitute "searches" for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 18 n. 15 
(1967) ; United States v. Lawson, 487 F . 2d 468 (CAS 1973); 
Mazzetti V. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 709-710, 484 P . 2d 84, 
[Footnote 2 i,s on p. 2] 
' f l 
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question requires a weighing of the governmental and 
societal interests advanced to justify such intrusions 
against the constitutionally protected interest of the in-
dividual citizen in the privacy of his effects. United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, - U. S. -, - (1976); 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. supra, at 878-
879 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 892 
(1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 447-448 
(1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1968). Cf. 
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 534-535. As noted 
in the Court's opinion, see ante, at --, three interests 
generally have been advanced in support of inventory 
searches: ( i) protection of the police from danger; 
(ii) protection of the police against claims and disputes 
90-91 (en bane). Cf. CardweU v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974) 
(plurality opinion). 
2 The principal decisions relied on by the State to justify the 
inventory search in this case, Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 
234 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), and Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433 (1973), each relied in part on significant 
factors not found here. Harris only involved an application of the 
"plain view" doctrine, In Cooper the Court validated an auto-
mobile search one week after the vehicle was impounded on the 
basis that the police had a possessory interest in it based on a 
state forfeiture statute requiring them to retain it some four months 
until the forfeiture sale. 386 U. S., at 61-62. Finally, in Cady 
t.he Court held that the sea.rch of an automobile trunk "which the 
officer reasonably believed to contain a gun" was not unreasonable· 
within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
413 U. S., at 448. See also id., at 436-437. The police in a 
typical inventory search cru;e, however, will have no reasonable belief 
as to the particular automobile's contents. And, although the 
police in this ca.se knew with certainty that there were items of 
personal property within the exposed mterior of the car-i. e., the 
watch of the dashboard-see p. -, ante, this information did not 
in the circtunstances of this case, provide additional justification 
for the search of the closed console glove compartment m which the-
contraband was discovered . 
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over lost or stolen property; (iii) protection of the own-· 
er's property while it remains in police custody. 
Except in rare cases, there is little danger associated 
with impounding unsearched automobiles. But the oc-
casional danger that may exist cannot be discounted en-· 
tirely. See Cooper v. California, 385 U. S. 58, 61-62 
(1967). The harmful consequences in those rare cases 
may be great, and there does not appear to be any effec-
tiVe way of identifying in advance those circumstances 
or classes of automobile impoundments which represent a 
greater risk. Society also has an important interest in 
minimizing the number of false claims filed against police 
since they may diminish the community's respect for law 
enforcement generally and lower department morale, 
thereby impairing the effectiveness of the police.8 It 
is not clear, however, how effective inventories are as· 
a means of discouraging false claims, since such claims 
need only be accompanied by an assertion that an item 
was stolen prior to the inventory or was intentionally 
omitted from the police records. 
The protection of the owner's property is a significant 
interest for both the policeman and the citizen. It is 
argued that an inventory is not necessary since locked' 
doors and rolled-up windows afford the same protection 
that the contents of a parked automobile normally enjoy.4· 
But many owners might leave valuables in their automo-· 
8 The interest in protecting the police from liability for lost or 
stol'en property is not relevant in this case. Respondent's motion to 
suppress was limited to items inside the automobile not in plain 
v1ew. And, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the 
removal of objects in plain view, and the closing of windows and' 
'lockmg of doors, satisfied any duty the police department. owed' 
the automobiles' owner to protect property while in police posse~ 
:non. - S. D.-,-, 228 N. W. 2d 52,- (1975) . 
4 See M ozzettt v. S111penor Cowrt, 4 Cal. 3d, at 709-710, 484 P~ 
'2'd .. at g()..-!JL 
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bile temporarily that they would not leave there unat-
tended for the several days that police custody may last. 
There is thus a substantial gain in security if automobiles 
are inventoried and valuable items removed for storage. 
And, while the same security could be attained 
by posting a guard at the storage lot, that alterna-
tive may be prohibitively expensive, especially for 
smaller· jurisdictions. 5 
Against these interests must be weighed the citizen's 
interest in the privacy of the contents of his automobile. 
Although the expectation of privacy in an automobile is 
significantly less than the traditional expectation of 
privacy associated with the home, United States v. Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, supra, at-; United States v. Ortiz, supra, 
at 876 n. 2; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 5-83, 590-
591 (1974) (plurality opinion), the unrestrained search 
of an automobile and its contents in many circumstances 
would constitute a serious intrusion upon the privacy 
of the individual. But such a search is not at issue in 
this case. As the Court's opinion emphasizes, the search 
here was limited to an inventory of the unoccupied auto-
mobile and was conducted strictly in accord with the 
regulations of the Vermillion Police Department.0 Up-
5 See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 
Harv. L. Rev. 835, 853 (1974). 
6 A complete "mventory report" is required of all vehicles im-
pounded by the Vermillion Police Department. The standard 
inventory consists of a survey of the vehicles' exterior-windows, 
fenders, tnmk, hood-apparently for damage, and its interior, to 
locate ''valuables" for storage. As part of each inventory in stand-
ard report form is completed. The report in this case listed the 
items d1scovered in both the automobile's mterior and the unlocked 
glove compartment. The only notation regarding the trunk was 
that it was locked. A pohce officer testified that all impounded 
vehicles are searched, that the search always includes the glove 
compartment, and that the trunk had not been searched in this case 
because it was locked. See App. 33-34 ; 73-79. 
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hoMing searches of this type thus provides no general 
license for the police to examine the contents of such 
automobiies.7 
I agree with the Court that the Constitution permits 
routine inventory searches, and turn next to the question 
whether they must be conducted pursuant to a warrank 
II 
While the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly in terms 
of 11unreasonab1e searches and seizures," 8 the decisions 
of this Court have recognized that the definition of "rea.-· 
sonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more specific 
dictates of the warrant clause. See United States ·:v: 
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 315 (1972); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967); Camara· 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 528. As the Court ex-
plained in Katz v. United States, supra, at 357, 
"[s] earches conducted without warrants have been held. 
unlawful 'notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing 
probable cause,' Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20', 
1 As part of their inventory search the police may discover rna-· 
terials such as letters or checkbooks that "touch upon intimate areas 
of an individual's personal affairs," and "reveal much about a per-
son's activities, associations, and belirfs." California Bankers Assn. 
v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 78 (1974) (PowELL, J., concurring). See 
also Fisher v. United States, - U. S. -,- n. 7 (1976). In 
this case the police found, inter alia, "miscellaneous papers," a 
checkbook, an installment loan book, and a social security status 
card. App. 77. There is, however, no evidence in the record that in· 
carrymg out their established inventory duties the Vermillion police 
d'o other than search for and remove for storage ~:;uch property, 
without examining its contents. 
8 The Amendment provides that 
"The right of the people to be Recure m their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable ;;earches and seizures, . 
shall not be violated and no Warrant;; shall ts;;ue, but upon probable· 
cau~r, ~upported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
Ing the phH'!' to be seatched, and the 12ersoos or things to be ~:;cized.'" 
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33 for the Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, im:-
partial judgment of a judicial officer ... be interposed 
between the citizen and the police .. .. ' Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U. S. 471, 481-482." Thus, although 
" [s]ome have argued that '[t]he relevant test is not 
whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, 
but whether the search was reasonable, United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950), ... [t]his view has 
not been accepted.'" United States v. United States Dis~ 
trict Court, supra, at 315 and n. 16. See Chimel v. Cali~ 
fornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Except in a few carefully 
defined classes of cases, a search of private property 
without valid consent is "unreasonable" unless it has 
been authorized by a valid search warrant. See, e. g., 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 269 
( 1973); Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 486 ( 1964); 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 528; United 
States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 51 (1951); Agnello v. 
United States, 269 U.S. 20,30 (1925). 
Although the Court has validated warrantless searches 
of automobiles in circumstances that would not justify a 
search of a home or office, Cady v. Dombrowski, supra; 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), these decisions estab~ 
lish no general "automobile exception" to the warrant re~ 
quirement. See Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364 
(1964). Rather, they demonstrate that "'for the pur~ 
pose of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional 
difference between houses and cars,' " Cady v. Dombrow~ 
ski, 413 U.S., at 439, quoting Chambers v. Maroney, su,. 
pra, at 52, a difference that may in some cases justify a 
warrantless search.9 
9 This difference turns primarily on the mobihty of the auto-
mobile and the impracticability of obtaimng a warrant in many 
circumstances, e. g., CarroU v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 153-
7~76-CONCU:R 
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The routine inventory search under consideration in 
this case does not fall within any of the established ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement. 10 But examination 
of the interests which are protected by conditioning, 
searches on warrants issued by a judicial officer reveals. 
that none of these is implicated here. A warrant may 
only issue upon "probable cause." In the criminal con-
text the requirement of a warrant thus protects the in-
dividual's legitimate expectation of privacy against the 
overzealous police officer. "Its protection consists in re-
quiring that those inferences [concerning probable 
cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate in-
stead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson 
v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). See Unitea 
States v. United States District Court, supra, at 316-318. 
Inventory searches, however, are not conducted in order 
to discover evidence of crime. The officer does not make 
a discretionary determination to search based on a judg-
ment that certain conditions are present. Such searches 
are conducted in accordance with established police de-
154 (1925), but the lesser expecta.tion of privacy in an automobile is 
also important. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 896 n. 
2 (1975) ; Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality 
opinion) ; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 275, 27~ 
(1973) (PowELL, J., concuring). See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 
U. S. 433,441-442 (1973). 
10 See, e. g., Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969) ; Terry v. 
Ohib, 392 U. S. 1; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298-300 
(1967); Cooper v. California , 386 U. S. 58 ; Brinegar v. Unitea 
States, 338 U. S. 160, 174...:177 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U. S., at 153, 156. See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 
451, 454--456 (1948) ; United States v. M app, 476 F. 2d 67, '76 
(CA2 1973) (listing then recognized exceptions to warrant require-
ment : (i) hot pursuit ; (ii) plain view doctrine; (iii) emergency 
situation ; (iv) automobile. search ; (v) cQnsent ; arid (vi) incident 
til arrest) . 
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partment rules or policy and occur whenever ~:~-n automo-
bile is seized. There are thus no special facts for a 
neutral magistrate to evaluate. 
A related purpose of the warrant requirement is to 
prevent hindsight from affecting the evaluation of the 
reasonableness of a search. See United States v. Mar-
tinez-Fuerte,- U.S.-,- (1976); cf. United States 
v. Watson,- U.S.-,- n. 22 (1976). In the case 
of an inventory search conducted in accordance with 
tandard police department procedures, there is no sig-
nificant danger of hindsight justification. The absence 
of a warrant will not impair the effectiveness of post-
search review of the reasonableness of a particular in-
ventory-search. 
Warrants also have been required outside the context 
of a criminal investigation. In Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U. S. 523, the Court held that, absent consent, 
a warrant was necessary to conduct an areawide building 
code inspection, even though the search could be made 
absent cause to believe that there were violations in the 
particular buildings being searched. In requiring a war .. 
rant the Court emphasized that " [ t] he practical effect 
of [the existing warrantless search procedures had been] 
to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the of-
ficial in the field," since 
"when [an] inspector demands entry, the occupant 
ha[d] no way knowing whether enforcement of the 
municipal code involved require [ d] inspection of his 
premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the 
ihspector's power to search, and no way of knowing 
whether the inspector himself [ Wf\S] acting under 
proper authorization." !d., at 532. 
In the inventory search context these concerns are absent. 
The owner or prior -occupant of the automobile is neither 
present nor, in many cases, is there any real 'likelihood 
75-76-CONCUR 
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that he could be located within a reasonable period of 
time. More importantly, no significant discretion is 
placed in the hands of the individual officer: he usually 
has no choice as to the subject of the search or as to its 
scope.11 
In sum, I agree with the Court that the routine inven-
tory search in. this case is constitutional. 
11 In this case, for example, the officer who conducted the search 
testified that after a second ticket had been issued for a parking 
violation the offending automobile was towed to the city impound 
lot.. The officer further testified that all vehicles taken to the lot 
are searched in accordance with a "standard inventory sheet" and 
"all items [discovered in the vehicle] are removed for safekeeping." 
App. 24, Seen. 6, supra. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
While I join the opinion of the Court, I add .this opin--
ion to express additional views as to why the search con-
ducted in this case is valid under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. This inquiry involves two 
distinct questions: (i) whether routine inventory searches 
are impermissible, and (ii) if not, whether they must be-
conducted pursuant to a warrant. 
I 
The central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to· 
s~feguard the privacy and security of individuals against 
arbitrary invasions by government officials. See, e. g., 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 
(1975); Camara v . .Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 
(1967). None of our prior decisions is dispositive of 
the issue whether the Amendment permits routine in-
ventory "searches" 1 of automobiles.2 Resolution of this 
1 Routine inventories of a.utomobi.\es intrude upon an area in which 
the private citizen has a "reasonable exportation of privacy." 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360 (1969) (Harlan, J., con-
curring). Thus, despite t.hoir benign purpose, when conducted by 
government officials they constitute "searches" for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 18 n. 15 
(1967); United States v. Lawson, 487 F. 2d 468 (CA8 1973); 
Mazzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 709-710, 484 P. 2d 84,. 
[Footnote 2 is on p . 2] 
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question requires a weighing of the governmental and 
societal interests advanced to justify such intrusions 
against the constitutionally protected interest of the in-
dividual citizen in the privacy of his effects. United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, - U. S. -, - (1976); 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878-
879 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 892 
(1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 447-448 
( 1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 ( 1968). Cf. 
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 534-535. As noted 
in the Court's opinion, see ante, at --, three interests 
generally have been advanced in support of inventory 
searches: (i) protection of the police from danger; 
(ii) protection of the police against claims and disputes 
9G-91 (1971) (en bane). Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 588, .'i91 
(1974) (plurality opinion). 
2 The principal decision<:: relied on by the State to justify the 
inventor~' search in thi,; ease, llarris v. United States, 390 U. S. 
234 (1968); Cooper v. California, il86 U.S. 58 (1967), and Cady v. 
J)om.browski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), each relied in part on sig.nifirant 
factors not found here. Harris only involved an application of the 
"pbin view" doctrine. In Cooper the Court vaJidated an auto-
mobile search that took place one week after the vehicle waR im-
pounded on the theory thnt the poJice had a possessory interest in 
the car based on a ~tate forfeiture statute requiring them to retain it 
some four months until the forfeiture sale. Sec 386 U. S., at 61-62. 
Finn lly, in Cady the Court held that the search of an automobile 
trunk "which the ofiicer rea3onably bclic,·e to contain a gun" was 
not; unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteen1 h 
Amendments. 413 U. S., at 448. See also id., at 436--437. The 
police in a typical il1\·entory search case, however, will haYe 110 rea-
sonable belief as to the particular automobile's contents. And, 
although the police in this case knew with certainty that there were 
items of per~onal property within the exposed interior of the car-
1:. e., the watch on the dashboard-sec p. -, ante, this informatio11 
alone did not, in the circmmtanecs of this ca~c, provide adJi1 ional 
justification for the search of the cJosed ronsole gloYe compartment 
in which the contraband was diseovercd. 
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over ;1ost or stolen property; and (iii) protection of the .1,. 
owner's property while it remains in pohce custody. 
Except in rare cases, there is little danger associated 
with impounding unsearched automobiles. But the oc-
casional danger that may exist cannot be discounted en-
tirely. See Cooper v. California, 385 U. S. 58, 61-62 
( 1967). The harmful consequences in those rare cases 
may be great, and there does not appear to be any effec-
tive way of identifying in advance those circumstances 
or classes of automobile impoundments which represent a 
greater risk. Society also has an important interest in 
minimizing the number of false claims filed against police 
since they may diminish the community's respect for law 
enforcement generally and lower department morale, 
thereby impairing the effectiveness of the police." It 
is not clear, however, that inventories are a completely 
effective means of discouraging false claims, since there 
remains the possibility of accompanying such claims with 
an assertion that an item was stolen prior to the inven-
tory or was intentionally omitted from the police records. 
The protection of the owner's property is a significant 
interest for both the policeman and the citizen. It is 
argued that an inventory is not necessary since locked 
doors and rolled-up windows afford the same protection 
that the contents of a parked automobile normally enjoy. 4 
But many owners might leave valuables in their automo-
a The intere~t in protecting the police from liability for lost or 
stolen property is not relevant in this ca~e. Respondent's motion to 
suppress was limited to items in8ide 1 he a11tomobile not in plain 
virw. And, the Supreme Court of South Dakota here held that 
the removal of objects in plain 1·iew, and the closing of windows and 
locking of doors, satiRfied nn~r duty the polire depnrtmf'nt owed 
the automobilrs' ownrr to protect property in police possession.--
S.D.-,-, 228 N. W. 2d 52,- (1975). 
"See Mozzetti v. Superior Cnu.rt. 4 Cal. 3d, nt 709-710, 484 P .. 
2d, n.t. 9(}....91. 
,, 
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bile temporarily that , they would not leave there unat-
t0nded for the several days that police custody may last, 
There is thus a substantial gain in security if automobiles 
are inventoried and valuable items removed for storage. 
And, while the same security could be attained 
by posting a guard at the storage lot, that alterna-
tive may be prohibitively expensive, especially for 
smaller jurisdictions." 
Against these interests must be weighed the citizen's 
interest in the privacy of the contents of his automobile. 
Although the expectation of privacy in an automobile is 
significantly less than the traditional expectation of 
privacy associated with the home, United States v. Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, supra, at-; United States v. Ortiz, supra, 
at 876 n. 2; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590~ 
591 ( 1974) (plurality opinion), the unrestrained search 
of an automobile and its contents would constitute a 
serious intrusion upon the privacy of the individual in 
many circumstances. But such a search is not at issue in 
this case. As the Court's opinion emphasizes, the search 
here was limited to an inventory of the unoccupied auto-
mobile and was conducted strictly in accord with the 
regulations of the Vermillion Police Department. 6 Up-
5 See Note, Warrantless Sra.rchPs nnrl. Seizures of AutomobileFi, 87 
Ha.rv. L. Rev. 835, 853 (197-J.). 
6 A complete "invent-ory report" is required of nil vehicles im-
pounded by tho Vermillion Polire Depflrtment. The standard 
inventory consists of a survey of the vehicles' exterior-windows, 
fenders, trunk, and hood-apparently for damage, and its interior, to 
locate "valuables" for storage. As part of each inventory a stand-
:ud report form is complcl ed. The report in this raRe listrd the 
items discovered in both the automobile's interior and the unlocked 
glove compartment. The only rJOtation regarding the trunk WflS 
that it was locked. A police officer testified that all impounded 
vehicles are searched, that the search always includes the glove 
compartment, and that the trunk hnd not been searched in ihir; case 
becnuse it was locked. Sec App. 33-34, 73-79. 
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holding searches of this type provides no general license 
for the police to examine all the contents of such 
automobiles.7 
I agree with the Court that the Constitution permits 
routine inventory searches, and turn next to the question 
whether they must be conducted pursuant to a warrant. 
II 
While the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly in terms 
of "unreasonable searches and seizures," 8 the decisions 
of this Court have recognized that the definition of "rea-
sonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more specific 
dictates of the warrant clause. See United States v. 
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 315 (1972); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967); Camara 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 528. As the Court ex-
plained in Katz v. United States, supra, at 357, 
"[s l earches conducted without warrants have been held 
unlawful 'notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing 
probable cause,' Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 
7 As part of their inventory search the police may discover ma-
terials such as letters or checkbooks that "touch upon intimate areas 
of a.n individual's personal affairs," and "reveal much about a per-
son's activities, associations, and beliefs." California Bankers Assn. 
v. Shultz, 416 U. S, 21, 78 (1974) (PowELL, ,T., concurring). Sec 
also Fisher v. United States, - U. S. -,- n. 7 (1976). In 
this case the police found, inter alia, "miscellaneous papers," a 
checkbook, an installment loan book, and a social security status 
card. App. 77. There is, however, no evidence in the record that in 
carrying out their established inventory duties the Vermillion police 
do other than search for and remove for storage such property 
without examining its contents. 
8 The Amendment provides that 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against tmreasonable searches and seiz11res, 
shall not be violated and no Warrants shall i;;;sue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particula.rly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 
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33, for the Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, im-
partial judgment of a judicial officer ... be interposed 
bet,veen the citizen and the police ... .' Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U. S. 471, 481-482.'' Thus, although 
"[s]ome have argued that '[t]hc relevant test is not 
whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, 
but whether the search was reasonable, United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950), ... [t]his view has 
not been accepted.'" United States v. United States Dis-
trict Court, supra, at 315 and n. 16. See Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Except in a few carefully 
defined classes of cases, a search of private property 
without valid consent is "unreasonable" unless it has 
been authorized by a valid search warrant. See, e. g., 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 269 
(1973); Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 486 (1964); 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 528; United 
States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 51 (1951); Agnello v. 
Unded States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 ( 1925). 
Although the Court has validated warrantless searches 
of automobiles in circumstances that would not justify a 
search of a home or office, Cady v. Dombrowski, supra; 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132 ( 1D25), these decisions estab-
lish no general "automobile exception" to the warrant re-
quirement. See Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364 
( 1964). Rather, they demonstrate that " 'for the pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional 
difference between houses and cars,'" Cady v. Dombrow-
ski, 413 U. S. , at 439, quoting Chambers v. Maroney, su-
pra, at 52, a difference that may in some cases justify a 
warrantless search." 
9 ThiR differenee turns primarily on the mobility of the auto-
mobile and the imprnl'tic.ability of obtnining a warrant in many 
eircumstances, e. g., Can·oll v. Un·ited States, 267 U. S. 132, 153- · 
' '. 
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The routine inventory search under consideration in 
this case does not fall within any of the established ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement.10 But examination 
of the interests which are protected when searches are 
conditioned on warrants issued by a judicial officer reveals 
that none of these is implicated here. A warrant may 
issue only upon "probable cause." In the criminal con-
text the requirement of a warrant protects the in-
dividual's legitimate expectation of privacy against the 
overzealous police officer. "Its protection consists in re-
quiring that those inferences [concerning probable 
cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate in-
stead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson 
v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). See.Ae. g., G) 
United States v. United States District Court, supra, at A 
316-318. Inventory searches, however, are not conducted 
in order to discover evidence of crime. The officer does 
not ma.ke a discretionary determination to search based 
on a judgment that certain conditions are present. In-
ventory searches are conducted in accordance with estab-
154 (1925) . The lesser expectation of priv:-tcy in nn automobile also 
is important. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891 , 896 n. 
2 (1975); Cardwell v. L ewis, 417 U. S., at 590; Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U. S. 275, 279 (1973) (PowELL, ,T., concurring) . 
Sec Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 441-442 . 
1 0 See, e. g., Chimel v. Cal1:jornia, 395 U. S. 752 (1969) ; Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 29SC-300 
(1967); Cooper v. California , 386 U. S. 58; Bn:negar · v. United' 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-177 (1949) ; Carroll v. United States, 267 
U. S., at 153, 156. See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 
451, 454-456 (1948) ; United States v. Mapp, 476 F. 2d 67, 76. 
(CA2 1973) (listing then-recognized exceptions to warrant require-
ment: (i) hot pur~uit; (ii) plnin view doctrine; (iii) emergrney 
situation ; (iv) automobile search ; (v) con8ent; and (vi) incident 
to arrest) . 
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lished police department rules or policy and occur when-
ever an automobile is seized. There are thus no special 
facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate. 
A related purpose of the warrant requirement is to 
prevent hindsight from affecting the evaluation of the 
reasonableness of a search. See United States v. Mar-
tinez-Fuerte,- U.S.-,- (1976); cf. United States 
v. Watson,- U.S. - ,- n. 22 (1976). In the case 
of an inventory search conducted in accordance with 
standard police department procedures, there is no sig-
nificant danger of hindsight justification. The absence 
of a warrant will not impair the effectiveness of post-
search review of the reasonableness of a particular in-
ventory search. 
·warrants also have been required outside the context 
of a criminal investigation. In Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U. S. 523, the Court held that, absent consent, 
a warrant was necessary to conduct an areawide building 
code inspection, even though the search could be made 
absent cause to believe that there were violations in the 
particular buildings being searched. In requiring a war-
rant the Court emphasized that "[t]he practical effect 
of [the existing warrantless search procedures had been] 
to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the of-
ficial in the field ," since 
"when [an] inspector demands entry, the occupant 
haf d] no way of knowing whether enforcement of 
the municipal code involved require [ d] inspection 
of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits 
of the inspector's power to search, and no way of 
knowing whether the inspector himself [was] acting 
under proper authorization." !d., at 532. 
In the inventory search context these concerns are absent. 
The owner or prior occupant of the automobile is not 
present, nor, in many cases, is th ere any real likelihood 
. -
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that he could be located within a reasonable period of 
time. More importantly, no significant discretion is 
placed in the hands of the individual officer: he usually 
has no choice as to the subject of the search or its scope.n 
In sum, I agree with the Court that the routine inven- . 
tory search in this case is constitutional. 
11 In this case, for example, the officer who conducted the search 
testified that the offending automobile was towed to the city im-
pound lot after a second ticket had been issued for a parking vio-
lation. The officer further testified that all vehicles taken to the lot 
arc searched in accordance with a "standard inventory sheet" and 
"all items [discovered in the vehicles] are removed for safekeeping." 
App. 24. See n. 6, supra. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
While I join the opinion of the Court, I add this opin--
ion to express additional views as to why the search con-
ducted in this case is valid under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. This inquiry involves two 
distinct questions: (i) whether routine inventory searches 
are impermissible, and (ii) if not, whether they must be-
conducted pursuant to a warrant. 
I 
The central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to-
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against 
arbitrary invasions by government officials. See, e. g., 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 
(1975); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 
(1967). None of our prior decisions is dispositive of 
the issue whether the Amendment permits routine in-
ventory "searches" 1 of automobiles.2 Resolution of this 
1 Routine inventories ·of automobiles intrude upon an area in which 
the private citizen has a "reasonable expectation of privacy."· 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. 8. 347, 360 (1969) (Harlan, J., con-
curring). Thus, despite tl1eir benign purpose, when conducted by 
government officials they constitute "searches" for purposes of the-
Fourth Amendment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 18 n. 15 
(1967); United States v. Lawson, 487 F. 2d 468 (CAS 1973) ; 
Mazzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 709-710, 484 P . 2d 84~ 
[Footnote 2 is on p . 2] 
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question requires a weighing of the governmental and 
societal interests advanced to justify such intrusions 
against the constitutionally protected interest of the in-
dividual citizen in the privacy of his effects. United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, - U. S. -, - (1976); 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878-
879 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 892 
(1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 447-448 
(1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1968). Cf. 
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 534-535. As noted 
in the Court's opinion, see ante, at --, three interests 
generally have been advanced in support of inventory 
searches: (i) protection of the police from danger; 
( ii) protection of the police against claims and disputes 
90-91 (1971) (en bane). Cf. Ca1'dwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 
(1974) (plurality opinion). 
2 The principal decisions n·Jied on by the S1a1 e to ju~tify the 
inventory search in thiR case, Ilan·is v. United States, 390 U. S. 
234 (1968); Coope1· v. California, 380 U.S. 58 (1967), and Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 4:~3 (1973), each relied in part on sig~1ifieant 
fartors not found here. Han·is only invo]vecl an application of the 
"plain view" doctrine. In Cooper the Court validated an auto-
mobile search that took place one week after the vehiele was im-
pounded on the theory that the police had a possessory interPst in 
the car based on a state forfeiture statute requiring thrm to rrtain it 
some four months until the forfeiture sale. See 380 U. S., at 61-02. 
Finally, in Cady the Court. held that the search of an automobile 
trunk "which the officer rcaHOll:1bly believe to contain a gun" wns 
not uureasonnble withi.n the meaning of the Fourth and Fourtee11th 
Amendments. 413 U. S., at 448. See also 1:d., at 436-4::!7. The 
police in a typical inventory search case, however, will haYe no rea-
sonable belief ~~~ to the particular automobile's contents. And, 
although t.he police in this case knew with certainty that there 'n're 
items of personnl property within the cxpot>cd interior of thr rar-
i. e., the watch on 1he dashboard-sec p. -, ante, thio information 
alone did not, in the circumstances of this cnse, provide additional 
justification for the search of t.hc closrd con8olc glove rom]l:utment 
in which the contrrtband wns discovered. 
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over , ost or stolen property; and (iii) protection of the .)_ 
owner's property while it remains in police custody. 
Except in rare cases, there is little danger associated 
with impounding unsearched automobiles. But the oc-
casional danger that may exist cannot be discounted en-
tirely. Sec Cooper v. California, 385 U. S. 58, 61-62 
( 1967). The harmful consequences in those rare cases 
may be great, and there does not appear to be any effec-
tive way of identifying in advance those circumstances 
or classes of automobile impoundments which represent a 
greater risk. Society also has an important interest in 
minimizing the number of false claims filed against police 
since they may diminish the community's respect for law 
enforcement generally and lower department morale, 
thereby impairing the effectiveness of the police.~ It 
is not clear, however, that inventories are a completely 
effective means of discouraging false claims, since there 
remains the possibility of accompanying such claims with 
an assertion that an item was stolen prior to the inven-
tory or was intentionally omitted from the police records. 
The protection of the owner's property is a significant 
interest for both the policeman and the citizen. It is 
argued that an inventory is not necessary since locked 
doors and rolled-up windows afford the same protection 
that the contents of a parked automobile normally enjoy.4 
But many omwrs might leave valuables in their automo-
~ The interc:-t in protecting the police from liability for lost or 
stolen pro]wrty iR not rrlrvniJt in this ca;:e. RPsponclent'R motion to 
suppres.~ was limited to items in~icle the :1\ltomobilr not in plain 
view. And , the Supreme Court of South Dakota here held that 
1 he remontl of object~ in plain ,·iew, and the closing of windows :mel 
lorking of door><, Fnti~fiecl an~· dut~· the polire clcp:trtment owed 
thP nutomobilcs' owner to prole(·! property in police pos~c,;sion. --
S.D.-,-, 22R N. W. 2d 52.- (1975). 
"Sec Mozzctti v. S11perior Cow·t. 4 C:1I. 3d, al 709-710, 4R4 P. 
2d, at 90-91. 
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bile temporarily that they would not leave there unat-
tended for the several days that police custody may last. 
There is thus a substantial gain in security if automobiles 
are inventoried and valuable items removed for storage. 
And, while the same security could be attained 
by posting a guard at the storage lot, that alterna-
tive may be prohibitively expensive, especially for 
smaller jurisdictions." 
Against these interests must be weighed the citizen's 
interest in the privacy of the contents of his automobile. 
Although the expectation of privacy in an automobile is 
significantly less than the traditional expectation of 
privacy associated with the home, United States v. Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, supra, at-; United States v. Ortiz, supra, 
at 876 n. 2; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590-
591 (1974) (plurality opinion), the unrestrained search 
of an automobile and its contents would constitute a 
serious intrusion upon the privacy of the individual in 
many circumstances. But such a search is not at issue in 
this case. As th<:' Court's opinion emphasizes, the search 
here was limited to an inventory of the unoccupied auto-
mobile and was conducted strictly in accord with the 
regulations of the Vermillion Police Department.6 Up-
5 See Note, Warrantless Searehl'H' nnd Seizures of Automobiles. 87 
Ha.rv. L. Rev. 835, 853 (1974). 
6 A complete "inventory report" i8 requirrd of ::dl vehiclrs im-
potmded by the Vetmillion Polic·e Department. The st:mdard 
inventory consists of a sun·cy of the vehicles' exterior-windows,. 
fenders, trunk, and hood-apparently for damage, and its int.erior, to 
locale "valuables" for sLomge. As part of each inventory a stand-
ard report form is completed. The report in this rase listed the 
items diseovered in both tho automobile's interior and tho unlorked. 
glove compartment. The only notation regarding the trunk was 
that it was locked. A polirc otricer testified that all impounded 
vehicles arc searched, that tho Rearch always includes the glove 
compartment, and that the trunk had not been searched in this ease 
bernuse it was locked. See App. 33-34, 73-79. 
i•• 
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holding searches of this type provides no general license 
for the police to examine all the contents of such 
automobiles.7 
I agree with the Court that the Constitution permits 
rou~ine inventory searches, and turn next to the question 
whether they must be conducted pursuant to a warrant. 
II 
While the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly in terms 
of "unreasonable searches and seizures," 8 the decisions 
of this Court have recognized that the definition of "rea-
sonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more specific 
dictates of the warrant clause. See United States v. 
United States District Cour-t, 407 U. S. 297, 315 (1972); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967); Camara 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S., at 528. As the Court ex-
plained in Katz v. United States, supra, at 357, 
"[s]earches conducted without warrants have been held 
unlawful 'notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing 
probable cause,' Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 
7 As part; of their inventory search the police may discover ma-
terials such as letters or checkbooks that "touch upon intimate arras 
of an individual's personal affairs," and "reveal much about a per-
son's activities, associations, and beliefs." California Bankers Assn. 
v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 78 (1974) (PowELL, J., concurring). See 
also Fisher v. United States, - U. S. -, - n. 7 (1976). In 
this case the police found, inter alia, "miscellaneous papers," a 
checkbook, an installment loan book, and a social security status 
card. App. 77. There is, however, no evidence in the record that in 
carrying out their esta,blished inventory duties the Vermillion police 
do other than search for and remove for siorage such property 
without examining its contents . . 
8 The Amendment provides that 
"The right of the people to be secure in their personA, houses, 
pn,pers, and effects, against tmrrnsonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particula.rly describ-
ing the place to be searched, :-mel tho persons or ihings to be ;;;eized." 
• 
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33, for the Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, im-
partial judgment of a judicial officer ... be interposed 
between the citizen and the police .... ' Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U. S. 471, 481-482." Thus, although 
"[s]ome have argued that '[t]hc relevant. test is not 
whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, 
but whether the search was reasonable, United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 66 (1950), ... [t]his view has 
not been accepted.'" United States v. United States Dis-
trict Court, supra, at 315 and n. 16. See Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Except in a few carefully 
defined classes of cases, a search of private property 
without valid consent is "unreasonable" unless it has 
been authorized by a valid search warrant. See, e. g., 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 269 
(1973); Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 486 (1964); 
Camara v. M 'unicipal Court, 387 U. S., at 528; United 
States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 51 (1951); Agnello v. 
United States, 260 U.S. 20,30 (192.5). 
Although the Court has validated warrantless searches 
of automobiles in circumstances that would not justify a 
search of a home or office, Cady v. Dombrowski, supra; 
Chmnbers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), these decisions estab-
lish no general "automobile exception" to the warrant re-
quirement. See Preston v. Um:ted States, 376 U. S. 364 
( 1964). Rather, they demonstrate that " 'for the pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional 
difference between houses and cars.' " Cady v. Dombrow-
ski, 413 U.S., at 439, quoting Chambers v. Maron ey, su-
pra, at 52, a difference that may in some cases justify a 
warrantless search.9 
9 This difference turn~ primarily on the mobilit~· of thr, a11to-
mobilo nnd tho impmcticnbility of obtnining a wnrnmt in m:1ny 
t·ircumstanres, e. g., Carroll v. United States, 207 U. S. 1:32, 153-
·"", 
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The routine inventory search under consideration m 
this case does not fall within any of the established ex-
ceptions to the wa.rrant requirement.10 But examination 
of the interests which are protected when searches are 
conditioned on warra.nts issued by a judicial officer reveals 
that none of these is implicated here. A warrant may 
issue only upon "probable cause." In the criminal con-
text the requirement of a warrant protects the in-
dividual's legitimate expectation of privacy against the 
overzealous police officer. "Its protection consists in re-
quiring that those inferences [concerning probable 
cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate in-
stead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson (':;) 
v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). Se~ e. g., ~ 
United States v. United States District Court, supra, at 
316-318. Inventory searches, however, are not conducted 
in order to discover evidence of crime. The officer does 
not make a discretionary determination to search based 
on a judgment that certain conditions are present. In-
ventory searches are conducted in accordance with estab-
154 ( 1925). The lesser expertntion of privacy in an automobile n!Ro 
is important. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 896 n. 
2 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis. 417 U.S., n,t 590; Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U. S. 275, 279 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring). 
Sec Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 441-442 . 
"
0 See, e. g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1; Warden v. Ilayden, 3R7 U. S. 294, 298-300 
( 1967); Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58; Brinegar v. United 
Stcttes, 338 U.S. H>O, 174-177 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U. S., at 153, 156. See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 
451, 454--456 (1948); United States v. Mapp, 476 F. 2d 67, 76 
(CA2 1973) (listing then-recognized exceptionR to warrant, require-
ment: (i) hot pur~uit. ; (ii) plain view doctrine; (iii) f'mcrgenry 
sit.uation; (iv) automobile search; ( v) conFent.; nncl (vi) incident 
to arrest). 
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lished police department rules or policy and occur when-
ever an automobile is seized. There are thus no special 
facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate. 
A related purpose of the warrant requirement is to 
prevent hindsight from affecting the evaluation of the 
reasonableness of a search. See Un·ited States v. Mar-
tinez-Fuerte,- U.S.-,- (1976); cf. United States 
v. Watson,- U.S.-,- n. 22 (1976). In the case 
of an inventory search conducted in accordance with 
standard police department procedures, there is no sig-
nificant danger of hindsight justification. The absence 
of a warrant will not impair the effectiveness of post-
search review of the reasonableness of a particular in-
ventory search. 
Vl arrants also have been required outside the con text 
of a criminal investigation. In Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U. S. 523, the Court held that, absent consent, 
a warrant was necessary to conduct an areawide building 
code inspection, even though the search could be made 
absent. cause to believe that there were violations in the 
particular buildings being searched. In requiring a war-
rant the Court emphasized that "[t]he practical effect 
of [the existing warrantless search procedures had been] 
to leave the occupm1t subject to the discretion of the of-
ficial in the field," since 
"when [an] insprctor demands entry, the occupant 
ha[d] no way of knowing whether enforcement of 
the municipal code involved require [ d] inspection 
of his premises, no wa.y of knowing the lawful limits 
of the inspector's power to search, and no way of 
knowing whether the inspector himself [was l acting 
under proper authorization." I d., at 532. 
In the inventory search context these concerns are absent. 
The owner or prior occupant of the automobile is not 
present, nor, in many cases, is there any real likelihood 
- . 
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that he could be located within a reasonable period of 
time. More importantly, no significant discretion is 
placed in the hands of the individual officer: he usually 
has no choice as to the subject of the search or its scope.11 
In sum, I agree with the Court that the routine inven-
tory sea.rch in this case is constitutional. 
11 In this case, for example, the officer who conducted the search 
testified that the offending automobile was towed to the city im-
pound lot after a second ticket had been issued for a parking vio-
lation. The officer further testified that all vehicles taken to the lot 
are searched in accordance with a "standard inventory sheet" and 
"all items [discovered in the vehicles] are removed for safekeeping." 
App. 24. Seen. 6, supra. 
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MR. JusTICE Pow:mLJ.., concurring. 
While I join the opinion of the Court, I add this opin-
ion to express additional views as to why the search con-
ducted in this case is valid under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. This inquiry involves two 
distinct questions: (i) whether routine inventory searches 
are impermissible, and (ii) if not, whether they must be· 
conducted pursuant to a warrant. 
I 
The central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to 
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against 
arbitrary invasions by government officials. See, e. g., 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 
(1975); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 
(1967) . None of our prior decisions is dispositive of 
the issue whether the Amendment permits routine in-
ventory "searches" 1 of automobiles.2 Resolution of this 
1 Routine inventories of automobiles int rude upon an area in whlch 
the private citizen has a "reasonable expectation of privacy." 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360 (1969) (Harlan, J., con-
curring). Thus, despite their benign purpose, when conducted by 
government officials they constitute "searches" for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 18 n. 15 
(1967) ; United States v. Lawson, 487 F . 2d 468 (CAS 1973); 
Mazzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 709- 710, 484 P . 2d 84, 
[Footnote 2 w on p 2] 
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question requires a weighing of the governmental and 
,societal interests advanced to justify such intrusions 
!1-gainst the constitutionally protected interest of the in~ 
dividual citizen in the privacy of his effects. United 
~tates v. Martinez-Fuerte, - U. S. -, - (1976); 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878-, 
~79 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 892 
(1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 447-448 
(1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1968). Cf, 
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 534-535. As noted 
in the Court's opinion, see ante, at -, three interests 
generally have been advanced in support of inventory 
searches: (i) protection of the police from danger; 
(ii) protection of the police against claims and disputes 
g(}-.91 (1971) (en bane). Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 
( 197 4) (plurality opinion) . 
2 The principal decisions relied on by the State to justify the 
inventory search in this case, Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 
234 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), and Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), each relied in part on significant 
factors not found here. Harris only involved an application of the 
"plain view" doctrine. In Cooper the C<>urt validated an auto-
mobile search that took place one week after the vehicle was im-
pounded on the theory that the police had a possessory interest in 
the car based on a state forfeiture statute requiring them to retain it 
some four months until the forfeiture sale. See 386 U. S., at 61-62. 
Finally, in Cady the Court held that the search of an automobile 
trunk "which the officer reasonably believe to contain a gun" was 
not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 413 U. S., at 448. See also id., at 436-437. The 
police in a typical inventory search case, however, will have no rea-
sonable belief as to the particular automobile's contents. And, 
although the police in this case knew with certainty that there were 
items of personal property within the exposed interior of the car-
i. e., the watch on the dashboard-see p. -, ante, this information 
alone did not, in the circumstances of this case, provide additional 
justification for the search of the closed console glove compartment 
in which the contraband was discovered. 
• 
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over lost or stolen property; and (iii) protection of the 
owner's property while it remains in police custody. 
Except in rare cases, there is little danger associated 
with impounding unsearched automobiles. But the oc-
casional danger that may exist cannot be discounted en: 
tirely. See Cooper v. California, 385 U. S. 58, 61-62 
( 1967). The harmful consequences in those rare cases 
may be great, and there does not appear to be any effec-
tive way of identifying in advance those circumstances 
or classes of automobile impoundments which represent a 
greater risk. Society also has an important interest in 
minimizing the number of false claims filed against police 
since they may diminish the community's respect for law 
enforcement generally and lower department morale, 
thereby impairing the effectiveness of the police. 3 It 
is not clear, however, that inventories are a completely 
effective means of discouraging false claims, since there 
remains the possibility of accompanying such claims with 
an assertion that an item was stolen prior to the inven-
tory or was intentionally omitted from the police records. 
The protection of the owner's property is a significant 
Interest for both the policeman and the citizen. It is 
argued that an inventory is not necessary since locked 
doors and rolled-up windows afford the same protection 
that the contents of a parked automobile normally enjoy.4 
But many owners might leave valuables in their automo-
3 The interest in protecting the police from liability for lost or 
stolen property is not relevant in this case. Respondent's motion to 
suppress was limited to items inside the automobile not in plain 
view. And, the Supreme Court of South Dakota here held that 
the removal of objects in plain view, and the closing of windows and 
locking of doors, satisfied any duty the police department owed 
the automobiles' owner to protect property in police possession. --
S. D.-,-, 228 N. W. 2d 52,- (1975) . 
4 See M ozzetti v. Superior Cov,rt, 4 Cal. 3d1 at 709-710, 484 P, 
2d, at 90-91 • 
. ' 
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I 
bile temporarily that they would not leave there unat .. 
tended for the several days that police custody may last. 
There is thus a substantial gain in security if automobile& 
11re inventoried and valuable items removed for storage. 
And, while the same · security could be attained 
py posting a guard at the storage lot, that alterna-
tive may be prohibitively expensive, especially for 
smaller jurisdictions.5 
Against these interests must be weighed the citizen's 
interest in the privacy of the contents of his automobile. 
Although the expectation of privacy in an automobile is 
significantly less than the traditional expectation of 
privacy associated with the home, United States v. Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, supra, at-; United States v. Ortiz, supra, 
at 876 n. 2; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590-
591 ( 1974) (plurality opinion), the unrestrained search 
of an automobile and its contents would constitute a 
serious intrusion upon the privacy of the individual in 
many circumstances. But such a search is not at issue in 
this case. As the Court's opinion emphasizes, the search 
here was limited to an inventory of the unoccupied auto-
mobile and was conducted strictly in accord with the 
regulations of the Vermillion Police Department.6 Up-
5 See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 
Harv. L. Rev. 835, 853 (1974) . 
6 A complete "inventory report" is required of all vehicles im-
pounded by the Vermillion Police Department. The standard 
inventory consists of a survey of the vehicles' exterior-windows, 
fenders, trunk, and hood-apparently for damage, and its interior, to 
locate "valuables" for storage. As part of each inventory a stand-
ard report form is completed. The report in this case listed the 
items discovered in both the automobile's interior and the unlocked 
glove compartment. The only notation regarding the trunk was 
that it was locked. A police officer testified that all impounded 
vehicles are searched, that the search always includes the glove 
compartment, and that the trunk ha.d not been searched in this case 
because it was locked. See App. 33-34, 73-79. 
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holding searches of this type provides no general license 
for the police to examine all the contents of such 
automobiles. 7 
I agree with the Court that the Constitution permits 
routine inventory searches, and turn next to the question 
whether they must be conducted pursuant to a warrant. 
II 
While the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly in terms 
of "unreasonable searches and seizures," 8 the decisions 
of this Court have recognized that the definition of "rea-
sonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more specific 
dictates of the warrant clause. See United States v. 
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 315 (1972); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967); Camara 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 528. As the Court ex-
plained in Katz v. United States, supra, at 357, 
• 
11 [s]earches conducted without warrants have been held 
unlawful 'notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing 
probable cause,' Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 
7 As part of their inventory search the police may discover ma-
terials such as letters or checkbooks that "touch upon intimate areas 
of an individual's personal affairs," and "reveal much about a per-
son's activities, associations, and beliefs." California Bankers Assn. 
v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 78 (1974) (PowELL, J., concurring). See 
also Fisher v. United States, - U. S. -, - n. 7 (1976). In 
this case the police found, inter alia, "miscellaneous papers," a 
checkbook, an installment loan book, and a social security status 
card. App. 77. There is, however, no evidence in the record that in 
carrying out their established inventory duties the Vermillion police 
do other than search for and remove for storage such property 
without examining its contents. 
8 The Amendment provides that 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath 'or affirmation, and particularly describ-
in~ the place tQ be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 
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~3, for the Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, im-: 
partial judgment of a judicial officer ... be interposed 
between the citizen and the police ... .' Wong Sun v1 
United States, 371 U. S. 471, 481-482." Thus, although 
"[s]ome have argued that '[t]he relevant test is no~ 
whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, 
but whether the search was reasonable, United States v, 
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950), ... [t]his view has 
not been accepted.'" United States v. United States Dis-
trict Court, supra, at 315 and n. 16. See Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U. S. 752 (1969). Except in a few carefully 
defined classes of cases, a search of private property 
without valid consent is "unreasonable" unless it has 
been authorized by a valid search warrant. See, e. g., 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 269 
(1973); Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 486 (1964); 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 528; United 
States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 51 (1951); Agnello v. 
United States, 269 U.S. 20,30 (1925). 
Although the Court has validated warrantless searches 
of automobiles in circumstances that would not justify a 
search of a home or office, Cady v. Dombrowski, supra; 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), these decisions estab-
lish no general "automobile exception" to the warrant re-
quirement. See Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364 
(1964). Rather, they demonstrate that "'for the pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional 
difference between houses and cars,' " Cady v. Dombrow-
ski, 413 U.S., at 439, quoting Chambers v. Maroney, su-
pra, a.t 52, a difference that may in some cases justify a 
warrantless search.9 
9 This difference turns primarily on the mobility of the auto-
mobile and the impracticability of obtaining a warrant in many 
circumstances, e. g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 153-
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The routine inventory search under consideration in 
this case does not fall within any of the established ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement.10 But examination 
of the interests which are protected when searches are 
conditioned on warrants issued by a judicial officer reveals 
that none of these is implicated here. A warrant may 
issue only upon "probable cause." In the criminal con-
text the requirement of a warrant protects the in-
dividual's legitimate expectation of privacy against the 
overzealous police officer. "Its protection consists in re-
quiring that those inferences [concerning probable 
cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate in-
stead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson 
v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). See, e. g., 
United States v. United States District Court, supra, at 
316-318. Inventory searches, however, are not conducted 
in order to discover evidence · of crime. The officer does 
not make a discretionary determination to search based 
on a judgment that certain conditions are present. In-
ventory searches are conducted in accordance with estab-
154 (1925). The lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile also 
is important. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 896 n. 
2 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S., at 590; Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U. S. 275, 279 (1973) (PoWELL, J., concurring). 
See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S., at 441-442. 
10 See, e. g., Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969) ; Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298--300 
(1967); Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58; Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U. S. 160, 174-177 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U. S., at 153, 156. See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 
451, 454-456 (1948) ; United States v. Mapp, 476 F . 2d 67, 76 
(CA2 1973) (listing then-recognized exceptions to warrant require-
ment : (i) hot pursuit; (ii) plain view doctrine; (iii) emergency 
situation; (iv) a-utomobile searchj (v) consentj a-nd (vi) incident 
to arrest). 
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lished police department rules or policy and occur when.r 
ever an automobile is seized. There are thus no special' 
facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate. 
A related purpose of the warrant requirement is to· 
prevent hindsight from affecting the evaluation of the· 
reasonableness of a search. See United States v. Mar-
tinez-Fuerte,- U.S.-,- (1976); cf. United States · 
v. Watson,- U. S. -,- n. 22 (1976). In the case· 
of an inventory search conducted in accordance with 
standard police department procedures, there is no sig-
nificant danger of hindsight justification. The absence 
. of a warrant will not impair the effectiveness of post-
search review of the reasonableness of a particular in-
ventory search. 
Warrants also have been required outside the context 
of a criminal investigation. In Camara v. Municipal' 
Court, 387 U. S. 523, the Court held that, absent consent, 
a warrant was necessary to conduct an areawide building 
code inspection, even though the search could be made 
absent cause to believe that there were violations in the 
particular buildings being searched. In requiring a war-
rant the Court emphasized that " [ t] he practical effect 
of [the existing warrantless search procedures had been] 
to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the of-
ficial in the field," since 
"when [an] inspector demands entry, the occupant 
ha[d] no way of knowing whether enforcement of' 
the municipal code involved require[d] inspection 
of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits 
of t,he inspector's power to search, and no way of' 
knowing whether the inspector himself [was] acting 
under proper authorization." I d. , at 532. 
In the inventory search context these concerns are absent. 
The owner or prior · occupant of the automobile is not . 
present, nor, in many cases, is there any real likelihood" 
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that he could be located within a reasonable period of 
time. More importantly, no significant discretion is 
placed in the hands of the individual officer: he usually 
has no choice as to the subject of the search or its scope.11 
In sum, I agree with the Court that the routine inven• 
tory search in this case is constitutional. 
11 In this case, for example, the officer who conducted the search 
testified. that the offending automobile was towed to the city im-
pound lot after a second ticket had been issued for a parking vio-
lation. The officer further testified that all vehicles taken to the lot 
are searched in accordance with a "standard inventory sheet" and· 
"all items [discovered in the vehicles] are removed for safekeeping,"' 
App .. 2:4. Seen. 6, supra •. 
